Epistemological Status of the Categories of Knowledge, Truth, and Error

The paper demonstrates the untenability of identifying knowledge with truth, which makes it impossible to establish the epistemological status of the category of error, since error is a type of knowledge. In significance, the category of error is comparable to the category of truth, as error inevitably accompanies scientific inquiry. Based on the combination of the principles of scientific realism and constructivism, a non-contradictory model of the relationship among the categories of knowledge, truth, and error is developed. It is noted that defining truth as knowledge corresponding to reality is inaccurate, as it implicitly allows for the existence of knowledge that does not correspond to reality. However, a mental phenomenon that does not correspond to any reality cannot be considered knowledge, e.g., a madman’s delusion. These difficulties can be overcome by using the Aristotelian principle of reflection (mirroring the properties of an object without the matter of the object), which is currently unjustly forgotten. Reflection is a generic concept for the category of knowledge, while knowledge is the generic concept for the categories of truth and error. Reflection can be material (e.g., the imprint of a signet ring in Aristotle’s example) or mental/ideal, i.e., knowledge. Knowledge is divided into truth and error. It is shown that both truth and error correspond to an object: truth corresponds to the essence of the object, while error corresponds only to certain appearances of the essence, i.e., its visibility, e.g., the geocentric system in astronomy. Radical constructivism is critically examined. It is argued that the constructive nature of cognition does not exclude but complements its reflective essence. The principle of constructivism can be productive only when combined with the principle of scientific realism. Constructivism, both at the sensory-empirical and rational-theoretical levels, involves creating models that most closely resemble reality; the formation of such models is characterized by the category of reflection.

EDN GKIAKN

References
[1] Il’yin V.V. Teoriya poznaniya. Vvedenie. Obschie problemy [Theory of knowledge. Introduction. General problems]. Moscow, Librokom Publ., 2012, 168 p.
[2] Nikiforov A.L. Analiz ponyatiya «znanie»: podkhody i problemy [An analysis of the concept of “knowledge”: approaches and problems]. Epistemologiya i filosofiya nauki (Epistemology & Philosophy of Science), 2009, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 61–73.
[3] Chertkova E.L. Tozhdestvennye li ponyatiya «znanie» i «istina»? [Are the concepts of “knowledge” and “truth” identical?]. Epistemologiya i filosofiya nauki (Epistemology & Philosophy of Science), 2009, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 92–94.
[4] Antonovskiy A.Yu. Nauka kak obschestvennaya podsistema [Science as a social subsystem]. Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), 2017, no. 7, pp. 158–171.
[5] Gumnitskiy G.N., Zelentsova M.G. Moral’ i religiya [Morality and religion]. Filosofiya i obschestvo (Philosophy and Society), 2012, no. 1, pp. 55–73.
[6] Varela F., Thompson E., Rosch E. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, 344 p.
[7] von Glasersfeld E. The radical constructivist view of science. Foundations of Science, 2001, vol. 6, nos. 1–3, pp. 31–43.
[8] von Foerster H. Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York; Berlin; London, Springer, 2007, 362 p.
[9] Lektorskiy V.A. Poznanie, deystvie, realnost [Knowledge, action, reality]. Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), 2017, no. 9, pp. 5–23.
[10] Boltsman L. Statyi i rechi [Articles and Speeches]. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1970, 408 p.
[11] Gubanov N.I. Chuvstvennoe otrazhenie: analiz problem v svete sovremennoy nauki [Sensory reflection: an analysis of problems in the light of modern science]. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986, 239 p.
[12] Gubanov N.I. K probleme aktivnosti i sotsialnoy obuslovlennosti chuvstvennogo otrazheniya [On the problem of activity and social determination of sensory reflection]. Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), 1984, no. 2, pp. 60–69.
[13] Harré R. Konstruktivizm i realizm [Constructivism and realism]. In: Lektorskiy V.A., ed. Perspektivy realizma v sovremennoy filosofii [Perspectives of realism in contemporary philosophy]. Moscow, Kanon+ Publ., 2017, pp. 136–147.
[14] Aristotle. De anima. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957 [In Russ.: Aristotel’. O dushe. Perevod P.S. Popova. Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe izdatelstvo (State social and economic Publ.), 1937, 196 p.].
[15] Nikiforov A.L. Znanie [Knowledge]. Epistemologiya i filosofiya nauki (Epistemology & Philosophy of Science), 2004, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 132–135.
[16] Gubanov N.I., Gubanov N.N. Sub”ektivnaya realnost i prostranstvo [Subjective reality and space]. Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy), 2015, no. 3, pp. 45–54.
[17] Porus V.N. Teoriya «skhodstva» protiv «lingvisticheskogo povorota», ili bluzhdanie v Khempton-Kortskom labirinte [The theory of “resemblance” versus the “linguistic turn,” or wandering in the Hampton Court maze]. Epistemologiya i filosofiya nauki (Epistemology & Philosophy of Science), 2009, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 77–80.
[18] Adekvatnyy. Sovremennyy slovar’ inostrannykh slov [Adequate. A modern dictionary of foreign words]. Moscow, Russkiy yazyk Publ., 1993, p. 21.
[19] Yarkova E.N. Istoriya i metodologiya nauki [History and Methodology of Science]. Tyumen, Tyumen State University Press, 2007, 320 p.
[20] Chudinov E.M. Dialektika nauchnogo poznaniya i problema istiny [The dialectics of scientific knowledge and the problem of truth]. Moscow, Znanie Publ., 1979, 64 p.